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JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AFTER CITIZENS UNITED
Alicia Bannon*

INTRODUCTION
Everyone interested in contributing [in a judicial election] has very
specific interests. . . . They mean to be buying a vote.
—Justice Paul Pfeifer, Supreme Court of Ohio1

Thirty-eight states use judicial elections as part of their system for
choosing high court judges. But what originated as a nineteenth century reform, reflecting the view that elected judges would be more
likely to check overreach by corrupt governors and legislatures,2 is
more accurately described today as part of the problem. In recent
decades, judicial races have become, in the frequently-cited words of
one observer, “nastier, noisier, and costlier,”3 prompting regular calls
for reform from many judges, bar associations, scholars, and task
forces.4 In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court entered into the conversation, ruling in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.5 that a West
Virginia Supreme Court justice was required, as a matter of due process, to recuse himself from hearing an appeal of a $50 million jury
* Senior Counsel, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law. The author is grateful
for the insights from participants at the April 2017 Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social
Policy at DePaul College of Law, where she presented an earlier draft of this paper, as well as for
research support from Cathleen Lisk, Harleen Gambhir, and Rebecca Mears.
1. Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 1, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/us/01judges.html?pagewanted=all.
2. See JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS 105 (2012).
3. Roy A. Schotland, Comment, 61 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 149, 150 (1998),
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1096&context=lcp.
4. See ABA COAL. FOR JUSTICE, AM. BAR ASS’N, JUDICIAL SELECTION: THE PROCESS OF
CHOOSING JUDGES 12–15 (2008), https://shop.americanbar.org/ebus/store/productdetails.aspx?
productid=217453; AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, WHITE PAPER ON JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 4
(2011), https://www.actl.com/docs/default-source/default-document-library/position-statementsand-white-papers/actl_white_paper_on_judicial_elections.pdf?sfvrsn=2; B. Michael Dann &
Randall M. Hansen, Judicial Retention Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1429, 1439–41 (2001),
http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol34/iss4/10; JUDICIAL SELECTION TASK FORCE, ASS’N OF
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE SELECTION OF JUDGES AND THE
IMPROVEMENT OF THE JUDICIAL SELECTION SYSTEM IN N.Y. STATE 5–32 (2006), http://www
.nycbar.org/pdf/report/Judicial_Selection_TaskForceReport_Dec2006.pdf; Michigan Judicial Selection Taskforce, Report and Recommendations 1–2, 7–12 (2012), http://www.mcfn.org/uploads/
documents/MIJudicialSelectionTaskForce.pdf.
5. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
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verdict.6 In Caperton, the CEO of the lead defendant spent more than
$3 million in support of the justice’s recent campaign for a seat on the
court.7
It was against this backdrop that, in 2010, the Supreme Court decided Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,8 upending a
century of precedent by striking down a law that barred corporations
and unions from using their general treasury funds for independent
expenditures in federal elections.9 Many critics of the ruling highlighted its implications for judicial elections, which had already attracted substantial special interest attention. In his dissent, Justice
John Paul Stevens, who would retire from the Court later that year,
warned that “[a]t a time when concerns about the conduct of judicial
elections have reached a fever pitch, the Court today unleashes the
floodgates of corporate and union general treasury spending in these
races.”10
Other legal observers echoed these concerns. Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor, who had been a vocal critic of judicial elections since her
2006 retirement from the Supreme Court,11 told a conference at Georgetown University Law Center that Citizens United would likely
create “an increasing problem for maintaining an independent judiciary.”12 She further noted that “if both [unions and corporations] unleash their campaign spending monies without restrictions, then I
think mutually-assured destruction is the most likely outcome.”13 Legal commentator Jeffrey Toobin likewise observed, “I think judicial
elections are really the untold story of Citizens United.”14 A report by
the Brennan Center for Justice, a long-time observer of judicial elections, warned, “The inevitable result will be increased corporate
spending in judicial elections—and increased threats to independent
and impartial courts.”15
6. Id. at 886.
7. Id. at 886.
8. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
9. Id. at 365–66; see also id. at 394–95 (Stevens J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 460.
11. See, e.g., John Schwartz, Effort Begun to End Voting for Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/24/us/24judges.html.
12. Adam Liptak, Former Justice O’Connor Sees Ill in Election Finance Ruling, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/us/politics/27judge.html.
13. Id.
14. Interview by Bill Moyers with Jeffrey Toobin, Staff Writer, the NEW YORKER, and Legal
Analyst, CNN (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/02192010/transcript2.html.
15. ADAM SKAGGS, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, BUYING JUSTICE: THE IMPACT OF Citizens United on Judicial Elections 2 (2010), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/BCReportBuyingJustice.pdf?nocdn=1.
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More than eight years after Citizens United, this Article considers
how these predictions have played out and what the current landscape
means for the fairness and integrity of state courts—where 95 percent
of all cases are filed.16 Drawing on fundraising and independent expenditure data from The New Politics of Judicial Elections report series,17 as well as on television spending data gathered by the Brennan
Center for the most recent 2015–16 supreme court election cycle,18
this Article argues that judicial races in the post-Citizens United world
have been transformed, at least at the supreme court level, but not in
the way many observers predicted.
There is little evidence that supreme court elections have seen
“floodgates” open with respect to total levels of spending—the preCitizens United trend of high-cost elections has continued, but there
has been no dramatic uptick in overall spending. In fact, in the
2013–14 election cycle,19 overall spending was slightly lower than in
other recent non-presidential cycles. Instead, Citizens United’s most
significant effect appears to be on the composition and transparency of
spending in judicial races. Outside spending by special interest
groups, many of which do not disclose their donors, has become increasingly important in supreme court elections, while direct contributions to candidates have fallen dramatically.
While not what critics predicted, this new reality presents serious
risks to the fairness and integrity of elected courts by: (1) leaving the
public in the dark about the interests that seek to shape state courts;
(2) exacerbating pressures on judicial decision-making, as outside
groups further politicize judicial campaigns’ tenor and messages; and
(3) creating new challenges for policies that seek to mitigate the harms
from special interest influence in judicial races.
16. ALICIA BANNON, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, RETHINKING JUDICIAL SELECTION IN
STATE COURTS 1 (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Rethinking_Judicial_Selection_State_Courts.pdf.
17. THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (ALL REPORTS), BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/new-politics-judicial-elections-all-reports. This biennial report on state supreme court elections is issued by the Brennan Center for
Justice, Justice at Stake, and the National Institute on Money in State Politics. The report series
covers election cycles since 2000. Final data for the 2015-16 cycle was not available at the time
this Article was written.
18. Television data was provided to the Brennan Center by Kantar Media/CMAG, and is
based on captured satellite data in the nation’s largest media markets. Kantar Media/CMAG’s
calculations do not reflect ad agency commissions or the costs of producing advertisements, nor
do they reflect the cost of ad buys on local cable channels. Spending estimates are available on
the Brennan Center’s Buying Time website. Buying Time, Brennan Center for Justice, https://
www.brennancenter.org/analysis/buying-time (last visited Aug. 2, 2017).
19. At this time this Article was written, this was the most recent cycle for which the Brennan
Center had final data.
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POLITICIZED JUDICIAL ELECTIONS

For most of the last century, state supreme court elections were
generally inexpensive and sleepy. Elections were frequently uncontested and campaigning, to the extent it occurred, typically focused on
candidates’ professional background and qualifications. But over the
past few decades, and particularly since the year 2000, judicial races,
especially at the state supreme court level, have come to look increasingly like ordinary political campaigns.20
Most strikingly, wealthy special interest groups have increasingly
turned their attention, and wallets, to judicial races. In the 2000-09
decade, 20 of the 22 states that use contested elections to select high
court judges set spending records.21 Much of this attention came from
interests who regularly appear in court: from 2000-09, 59 percent of all
contributions to state supreme court candidates came from lawyers,
lobbyists, and business interests.22
Efforts to shape courts in a more “business” or “plaintiff”-friendly
direction have often been key drivers of spending, with corporate interests generally supporting Republican candidates and plaintiffs’ lawyers generally supporting Democratic candidates.23 Indeed, spending
has often been highest in states with closely-divided courts,24 and since
2000, an influx of spending has corresponded with shifts in the ideological composition of at least nine state supreme courts.25
This spending has also created potential conflicts of interest for
judges. A study of the Nevada Supreme Court, for example, found
20. Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 639–40
(2009), http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1386&context=dlj.
21. JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 2000–2009, at 1 (2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/JASNPJE-Decade-ONLINE.pdf.
22. Id. at 8.
23. SCOTT GREYTAK ET AL., BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, BANKROLLING THE BENCH:
THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2013–14, at 30 (2014), http://newpoliticsreport.org/
app/uploads/JAS-NPJE-2013-14.pdf; see also Debra Erenberg & Matt Berg, The Dark Night
Rises: The Growing Role of Independent Expenditures in Judicial Elections After Citizens
United, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 501, 508 (2013), https://willamette.edu/law/resources/journals/
review/pdf/Volume%2049/49-4%20ERENBERG%20%20BERG%20ME%20Format.pdf.
24. ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 2011–12, at 5–11 (2013), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/New%20Politics%20of%20Judicial%20Elections%202012.pdf; ADAM SKAGGS, ET AL.,
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2009–10, at 3–4 (2011),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Democracy/NewPolitics2010.pdf.
25. BANNON, supra note 16, at 30 n.39 (Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and West Virginia); Anne Blythe & Lynn Bonner, Rare Big Win for Democrats Tilts Party Balance on NC Supreme Court, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Nov. 10, 2016, http://
www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/article114053308.html (North Carolina).
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that in 60 percent of civil cases decided in 2008-09, at least one of the
litigants, attorneys, or firms involved in the case had contributed to
the campaign of at least one justice.26 And, while causation is difficult
to prove, numerous studies have shown a correlation between campaign contributions and justices’ votes.27 Even more striking, in a
2001 survey of state supreme court, appellate, and trial judges, 46 percent said they believed campaign contributions had at least some impact on judges’ decisions.28
In addition to heightened spending, judicial campaigns have
changed in other ways as well. Television has become increasingly important. In 2000, 22 percent of states with contested supreme court
elections featured television ads.29 In 2004, the number rose to 80
percent, and in 2006, it was 91 percent.30 With greater reliance on
television, attack ads have become more common,31 and judges are
regularly targeted for prior decisions on the bench.32 Judges have also
become more likely to describe themselves in overtly political terms,
including highlighting their positions on contested issues like gun
rights.33 Additionally, after a 2002 Supreme Court decision that
struck down a judicial conduct rule that prohibited judicial candidates
from announcing their views on “disputed legal or political issues,”34
states also have fewer tools to regulate behavior on the judicial campaign trail.35
Thus, even before Citizens United, state supreme court elections increasingly looked similar to political campaigns. Of particular note to
commentators, these elections had already attracted substantial sums
from special interest groups with a financial interest in the precedents
state courts set, and sometimes in particular cases pending before
26. BANNON, supra note 16, at 8.
27. See, e.g., JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, FAIR COURTS: SETTING
RECUSAL STANDARDS 11 (2008), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Democracy/Recusal%20Paper_FINAL.pdf (citing studies).
28. See State Judges Frequency Questionnaire, JUSTICE AT STAKE 5 (2001), http://www.justice
atstake.org/media/cms/JASJudgesSurveyResults_EA8838C0504A5.pdf.
29. SAMPLE, ET AL., supra note 21, at 24.
30. Id.
31. Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, Judging Judicial Elections, 114 MICH. L. REV.
929, 934 (2016), http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol114/iss6/6.
32. See, e.g., SAMPLE, ET AL., supra note 21, at 32.
33. BANNON, supra note 16, at 10–11.
34. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002).
35. More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to a Florida
rule barring the direct solicitation of campaign contributions by judicial candidates. WilliamsYulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). Williams-Yulee makes clear that states do retain the
ability to regulate judicial election conduct in ways that would be impermissible for non-judicial
races, placing important limits on White’s reach.
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those courts. At the same time, a growing chorus of sitting and retired
judges were acknowledging that election pressures had the potential
to undermine the promise of equal justice. As Richard Neely, a retired chief justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,
observed in a 2006 interview with The New York Times, “It’s pretty
hard in big-money races not to take care of your friends. It’s very
hard not to dance with the one who brung you.”36
II.

CITIZENS UNITED

AND

ITS PROGENY

It was against this backdrop that Citizens United changed the legal
landscape for campaign finance regulation, which had direct implications for judicial elections.37
It was, to put it mildly, a controversial decision. Citizens United is
the rare Supreme Court decision that many non-lawyers know by
name. Days after the opinion was issued, President Barack Obama
criticized the ruling during his State of the Union address as six justices sat in the audience.38 During the 2016 presidential election, both
Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders campaigned on overruling it.39
Hundreds of municipalities have passed resolutions or ordinances supporting a constitutional amendment to overturn the decision, as have
at least thirteen states.40 While Citizens United has in part functioned
as a short-hand for broader objections to the role of money in politics,
it was indeed a sea change in the law.
The immediate holding in Citizens United was to strike down a federal ban on corporate (and union) independent expenditures.41 However, the ruling has cast such a long shadow over election law, and
U.S. democracy, because of its reasoning, which dramatically narrowed the kind of “corruption” that could justify campaign finance
regulations. Reasoning that the “fact that speakers may have influ36. Liptak & Roberts, supra note 1.
37. This section draws on analysis of Citizens United and its implications by Daniel I. Weiner.
See DANIEL I. WEINER, Citizens United Five Years Later, Brennan Center for Justice (2015),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Citzens_United_%20Five_Years_Later
.pdf.
38. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Gets a Rare Rebuke, In Front of a Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
28, 2010, at A12, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/29/us/politics/29scotus.html.
39. See Jacob Pramuk, Hillary Clinton: Here’s What I Want in the Supreme Court, CNBC, Oct.
19, 2016, https://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/19/hillary-clinton-heres-what-i-want-in-the-supremecourt.html; Eric Bradner, Bernie Sanders Has a Supreme Court Litmus Test, CNN, May 10, 2015,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/10/politics/bernie-sanders-supreme-court-litmus-test-election-2016/
index.html.
40. See Move to Amend, Resolutions & Ordinances, https://movetoamend.org/resolutionsmap (last visited July 31, 2017).
41. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66.
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ence over or access to elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt,” the Court limited the state’s “corruption” interest
to “quid pro quo” deals (i.e., money for votes) or the appearance
thereof.42 The Court also concluded (without any supportive facts in
the record), that “independent expenditures, including those made by
corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”43 Based on this reasoning, in SpeechNow.org v. Federal
Election Commission,44 the D.C. Circuit invalidated all federal limits
on outside spending and limits on contributions to groups that only
make independent expenditures.45 With this ruling, so-called Super
PACs were born. Citizens United and SpeechNow likewise freed
outside spenders to engage in “express advocacy” without restrictions,
and made it easier for shadowy groups to engage in election
spending.46
At the state level, the impact of Citizens United is even more complex. The immediate impact of Citizens United varied depending on
the laws on the books, which were in many states already weaker than
federal laws. Prior to the ruling, twenty-three states had bans on independent expenditures by corporations, including nineteen states that
utilized judicial elections.47 Citizens United effectively invalidated
these prohibitions, along with state bans on union expenditures.48 Citizens United, coupled with SpeechNow, likewise served as the death
knell for state law limits on contributions to independent expenditureonly committees (i.e., state Super PACs),49 as well as for regulations
on the kind of advocacy outside groups could undertake during an
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 359.
Id. at 357.
599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
Id. at 695–96.
See WEINER, supra note 37, at 7, 15 n.17.
See JOANNA SHEPHERD & MICHAEL S. KANG, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY FOR
LAW AND POLICY, SKEWED JUSTICE, (2014), http://skewedjustice.org/.
48. Moreover, a study that compared spending trends post-Citizens United in states that did
and did not have corporate independent expenditure bans prior to the ruling found evidence
that Citizens United bore a causal relationship with increases in outside spending in subsequent
elections. The authors found:
[W]hile independent expenditures increased in both treated and control states between
2006 and 2010, the increase was more than twice as large in the treated states, and
nearly all of the new money was funneled through nonprofit organizations and political
committees where weak disclosure laws and practices protected the anonymity of the
spenders.
DOUGLAS M. SPENCER & ABBY K. WOOD, Citizens United, States Divided: An Empirical Analysis of Independent Political Spending, 89 IND. L.J. 315 (2014).
49. See Gen. Majority Pac v. Aichele, No. 1:14-CV-332, 2014 WL 3955079, at *2–5 (M.D. Pa.
Aug. 13, 2014) (invalidating Pennsylvania’s contributions limits with respect to independent expenditure-only groups, and citing other cases).
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election.50 Thus, as James Sample has observed, Citizens United functioned as a “one-way ratchet” for states and the regulation of money
in judicial elections.51 It eliminated campaign finance restrictions
where they existed and maintained the legal status quo in states where
they did not, along with foreclosing any future reforms.
Beyond its immediate impact on state law, the changes Citizens
United brought to federal elections may also have had other spillover
effects in the states. For example, Citizens United incentivized new
groups to focus on election spending at the federal level. However,
once these groups were created, they were free to spend in state elections as well. For judicial election observers, this new legal landscape
seemed poised to transform already politicized races for state high
courts.
III. SPENDING PATTERNS IN SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS
AFTER CITIZENS UNITED
So, at least with respect to judicial elections, did Citizens United live
up to expectations? Spending patterns in state supreme court elections since Citizens United suggest that the ruling did dramatically
change judicial campaigns, but not by opening the spending “floodgates” in the way that commentators at the time predicted. Rather,
the new openings the decision created for outside spending, including
dark money, have been far more transformative: while total spending
in supreme court elections has been roughly constant since Citizens
United, much of that spending has shifted to outside groups, many of
which are not transparent about their donors. Collectively, these
changes pose substantial new challenges to judicial integrity.
A. The Shift to Outside Spending
During the last two election cycles for which, at the time this Article
was written, complete data existed (2011–12 and 2013–14), supreme
court races did not experience a dramatic infusion of new money. Total spending in 2011–12 was $57.7 million, virtually indistinguishable
from the $57 million that was spent in the 2007-08 presidential election cycle.52 In 2013–14, total spending was $34.5 million, slightly
lower than previous cycles; $38.1 million was spent in 2009–10.53
50. See WEINER, supra note 37, at 14 n.16.
51. James Sample, Retention Elections 2010, 46 UNIV. S. FLA. L. REV. 383, 393 (2011), http://
scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship/1045.
52. GREYTAK ET AL., supra note 23, at 12.
53. Id.
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Rather, the most notable change in recent election cycles has been
in the composition of spending—groups, spending separately from
candidates, have become increasingly important players. In 2011–12,
outside groups made up a record 27 percent of total election spending, and the amount spent by groups ($15.4 million) was more than 50
percent greater than the previous outside spending record ($9.8 million in 2003–04).54 In the 2013–14 cycle, outside groups set another
new record, making up 29 percent of total spending.55 Major players
have included several conservative or libertarian groups supporting
Republican candidates, most notably the Republican State Leadership
Committee, which put nearly $3.4 million into five state and local judicial races in 2014 as part of a new “Judicial Fairness Initiative.”56
Democratic candidates have received backing principally from statebased groups with ties to plaintiffs’ trial lawyers.57 In Montana, for
example, Montanans for Liberty and Justice spent nearly $520,000 in
support of the incumbent justice during Montana’s 2014 supreme
court election.58
While complete data for 2015–16 was not available at the time this
Article was written, television spending estimates suggest that the
trend of heightened outside spending is not only continuing, but accelerating. Interest groups spent nearly 50 percent more on television
ads than in the previous presidential election cycle—over $20 million
compared with the previous high of $13.5 million in 2012.59 Moreover, for the first time, television spending by groups exceeded candidates’ own television expenditures, making up 55 percent of television
spending, compared with 38 percent in the last presidential election
cycle. At the same time, political parties essentially disappeared from
state supreme court races, making up less than one percent of total
television spending, as compared to 24 percent in the last presidential
cycle.60
B. Secret Money, Secret Interests
As interests have increasingly moved from making direct contributions to candidates to spending via outside groups, much of that
54. BANNON ET AL., supra note 24, at 1.
55. GREYTAK ET AL., supra note 23, at 2.
56. Id. at 30.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 15, 37, 46.
59. Spending estimates were provided to the Brennan Center by Kantar Media/CMAG.
60. Spending By Outside Groups in Judicial Races Hits Record High, Secret Money Dominates, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/press-release/spending-outside-groups-judicial-races-hits-record-high-secret-money-dominates.
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spending has been non-transparent. This is likely another by-product
of Citizens United, which made it easier for interest groups to influence elections via shell organizations or nonprofit groups that do not
disclose their donors.61
Television data from the 2015–16 election cycle shows the extent to
which secret money has permeated state supreme court races: nearly
all of the outside spending in these races came from groups that are
not fully transparent about their donors. Only three of the twenty
groups that spent money on television ads during that cycle were fully
transparent about their donors. The rest, either did not disclose their
donors at all, or their donor lists included PACs or other groups, making it difficult, and sometimes impossible, to discern the underlying
interests.62 In Kansas, for example, a high-profile retention election
for five sitting justices attracted more than $2 million in television
spending, all from groups that did not disclose their donors.63 The
prevalence of secret money in these judicial races is also consistent
with broader trends in state elections. A recent Brennan Center study
found unprecedented levels of secret spending in state ballot measures
in 2016,64 while research into state and local elections in six states
found that fully transparent spending had declined from 76 percent in
2006 to just 29 percent in 2014.65
A second challenge to transparency is weak state laws governing the
reporting of independent expenditures, which allow groups to avoid
reporting their campaign spending altogether. According to a 2014
study, twenty-four states either limit the reporting of independent expenditures to instances where groups explicitly call for the election or
defeat of a candidate (creating an easy loophole for groups that avoid
those “magic words”) or do not require outside spending to be re61. See WEINER, supra note 37, at 7; Center for Responsive Politics, Outside Spending, https://
www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2017). This lack of transparency includes so-called “dark money” – spending by groups that do not disclose their donors – as well
as “gray money” – spending by groups whose donors are made of other groups, thus making it
impossible to discern underlying interests without sifting through multiple layers of disclosure.
CHISUN LEE AT AL., BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, SECRET SPENDING IN THE STATES 5 (2016),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Secret_Spending_in_the_States.pdf
(defining dark and gray money).
62. Spending by Outside Groups in Judicial Races Hits Record High, Secret Money Dominates,
supra note 60.
63. Buying Time 2016 – Kansas, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, https://www.brennancenter
.org/analysis/buying-time-2016-kansas (last visited Aug. 2, 2017).
64. Iris Zhang & Chisun Lee, Anonymous Donors Spent Record Amounts on 2016 State Ballot
Questions, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/
anonymous-donors-spent-record-amounts-2016-state-ballot-questions.
65. LEE ET AL., supra note 61, at 2.
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ported at all.66 In Michigan, for example, $4.6 million in television
spending on the 2014 Michigan Supreme Court election was never reported to the state’s campaign finance authority, according to a study
that compared Michigan campaign finance filings with records of ad
buys from state broadcasters and cable companies.67
What does this lack of transparency mean in practice? One recent
example from Montana highlights some of the concerns. In 2012, a
new and little-known group called the Montana Growth Network
spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on Montana’s 2012 Supreme
Court election, attacking one candidate, Ed Sheehy, for his efforts as a
public defender to avoid the death penalty for his client. “It was a
slap in the face for victims’ families and justice,” said the group’s radio
spot and mailers, which warned that Sheehy “wants to take his activist
values to the Montana Supreme Court.”68 The group spent more than
the candidates combined, and Sheehy ultimately lost his race to Judge
Laurie McKinnon.69
The Montana Growth Network, which was structured as a social
welfare organization under the tax code, did not disclose who was behind its spending at the time. However, three years later, its donors
were made public after an investigation by the state’s election authority determined that it had violated state campaign finance and disclosure laws.70 It thus provides an unusual glimpse into the interests
behind secret money.
Who was behind the attacks on Sheehy? One major set of contributors were oil and gas companies that operated in the state.71 These
companies regularly appear in state court, but have little apparent interest in the criminal justice issues highlighted in the group’s ads and
mailers. Another contributor was the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a
group whose own donors are undisclosed.72 Most striking, however,
66. PETE QUIST, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON MONEY IN STATE POLITICS, SCORECARD: ESSENDISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS FOR INDEPENDENT SPENDING, 2014 (2014), https://www.followthemoney.org/research/institute-reports/scorecard-essential-disclosure-requirements-forindependent-spending-2014/.
67. MICHIGAN CAMPAIGN FINANCE NETWORK, CAMPAIGN FINANCE SUMMARY, MICHIGAN
SUPREME COURT CAMPAIGN 2/1/2014-11/24/2014 (2015), http://mcfn.org/uploads/documents/
2014Supremes_campaign_postgen_rev.pdf.
68. Paul Blumenthal, Two of America’s Richest Men Secretly Tried to Sway Montana’s Judicial
Elections, HUFFPOST POLITICS (May 10, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/montanadark-money-judicial-race_us_572b9f4ce4b016f378951c8f.
69. Id.
70. Hamlett v. Montana Growth Network, COPP-2012-CFP-053 (Mont. Comm’r Political
Practices 2015), http://politicalpractices.mt.gov/Portals/144/2recentdecisions/HamlettvMontana
GrowthNetworkDecision.pdf.
71. Id.
72. Id.
TIAL
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was the $300,000 the group received from two out-of-state billionaires,
Charles Schwab, the founder of the eponymous discount brokerage
firm, and James Cox Kennedy, the chair of the media group Cox Enterprises.73 Both men owned estates in Montana, and both had been
previously involved in lawsuits challenging Montana’s liberal public
access laws for streams and other waterways.74 At the time of the
2012 supreme court election, Kennedy had filed a new lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the state’s entire stream access law.75
The state Supreme Court ultimately heard the case and upheld the
law by a 5-2 vote. One of the two justices who sided with Kennedy?
Justice McKinnon.76
Ironically, Montana is a state with relatively strong disclosure laws,
which is why the Montana Growth Network’s donors were ultimately
revealed three years later. Indeed, the state’s experience illustrates
some of the challenges in giving teeth to disclosure in the face of ballooning outside spending: the Montana Growth Network was a small
and little-known group that made a big splash in an important state
election. It flouted state election laws, but its underlying interests
were revealed only years later, long after the time it would be relevant
to voters. Importantly, unlike political parties with long-term reputational interests, it is easy to disband and create a new group for the
next election.
Montana’s experience also illustrates why the rise of secret money
groups, most of which will never have their donors revealed publicly,
raises particular concerns in the judicial election context. First, secret
money can obscure the identity of powerful interests seeking to shape
courts’ ideological composition, interests which may have a strong economic interest in how state courts rule on important legal issues, or
even a direct stake in pending litigation. They can thereby have an
outsized impact on judicial races, which are often low on information
to begin with, without giving the public sufficient information to assess
their motives or credibility. This is particularly so when, as was the
case in Montana, there was a disconnect between the group’s “tough
on crime” message and the actual interests of its funders.
The situation in Montana also shows how secret spending can obscure conflicts of interest in court cases. This has the potential to undermine public confidence in the integrity of state courts and deny
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Pub. Lands Access Ass’n v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Madison Cty., 321 P.3d 38 (Mont. Sup.
Ct. 2014).
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litigants the information needed to call for recusal in the appropriate
circumstance. There is no evidence that Justice McKinnon was aware
of who was spending on her behalf. But even when judges are unaware of the identity of donors to dark-money groups, secret spending
can corrode public confidence by creating the appearance of unseemly
connections and conflicts.77 This is particularly so because, as discussed below, most states lack clear guidance on when and how a
judge would need to inform the parties or recuse herself in the event
she was aware of such conflicts.78
C. Shifting Tones and Heightened Pressure on Judges
The growing prominence of outside groups in supreme court elections may also increase the likelihood that judges will be attacked for
decisions on the bench, as outside groups have historically been more
willing to go on the attack than the candidates themselves. Such a
move toward greater negativity has the potential to not only alter the
tenor of supreme court races, but also may heighten pressures on judicial decision-making itself.
Outside groups tend to put out different messages than judicial candidates. In 2013–14, for example, more than 90 percent of “traditional” television ads in supreme court races (i.e., ads that focus on a
candidate’s background and experience) came from candidates themselves.79 In contrast, more than 85 percent of negative ads were sponsored by outside groups, including several criminal justice themed ads
that, among other things, described judges as “liberal on crime,” or
“not tough on child molesters.”80 Outside groups were responsible for
half of all criminal justice-themed ad spots, and 78 percent of all ads
criticizing a judge’s decision on the bench, despite sponsoring only a
third of ad spots overall.81
77. Cf. JAMES L. GIBSON, ELECTING JUDGES: THE SURPRISING EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGNING ON
JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY 6–8 (2012) (survey data suggesting that conflicts of interest stemming
from judicial campaign spending impacts public confidence in the courts).
78. See infra Part IV.
79. This calculation was made by the author based on the statistics provided on the following
website: TV Ad Archive, State Supreme Court Elections, The Politics of Judicial Elections, https://
judicialpolitics.org/election-cycle/2015-16/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
80. GREYTAK ET AL., supra note 23, at 54, 64. Interestingly, during this cycle candidates’ ads
were unusually positive, which meant that in the aggregate campaign ads were more positive
than in other recent cycles, even though many outside groups went on the attack. It is too early
to tell if this will be a long-term pattern, but it raises the possibility that candidates, knowing that
outside groups will likely be spending on their behalf, and are likely willing to go negative, will
change their own behavior in response. At the same time, in the long-term, outside groups may
come to so dominate the airwaves that even with a “substitution” effect by candidates, races
become more negative overall.
81. Id. at TV Ad Archive.
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These differences are not surprising. Judicial candidates may have
reputational reasons for avoiding mudslinging, and they are bound by
codes of conduct that limit how they can speak about themselves or
their opponents. When outside groups put out ads, however, candidates have less control over and are less closely associated with the
resulting campaign messages.82 As political scientists Joanna Shepherd and Michael Kang have pointed out, such dynamics are likely to
be particularly important with respect to attacks on judges for their
decisions in criminal cases:
Candidates for judicial office are frequently concerned about appearing aggressively negative, wishing instead to convey an image of
“judicial temperament” in their campaigns. Thus, the best means of
paying for a sensationalist attack advertisement involving a violent,
bloody fact pattern may be an independent expenditure by an
outside group not directly connected to the benefitting candidate.83

Importantly, increased attacks on judicial decisions can matter far
beyond election day. The late California Supreme Court Justice Otto
Kaus famously observed that deciding controversial cases when a
judge knows he or she will be facing an election is like “finding a crocodile in your bathtub when you go in to shave in the morning. You
know it’s there, and you try not to think about it, but it’s hard to think
about much else while you’re shaving.”84 This intuition, that judges
respond to election pressures when deciding hot-button cases, is borne
out by numerous studies, which have found, for example, that judges
sentence more harshly in election years.85 In particular, a recent study
by Shepherd and Kang found that as more television ads aired during
state supreme court elections, justices became less likely to vote in
favor of criminal defendants.86 Likewise, justices in states whose bans
on corporate and union independent expenditures were struck down
by Citizens United were less likely to vote in favor of criminal defendants than they were before the ruling.87 The authors theorized that
because “the availability of such [independent expenditures] can dra82. States vary in the extent to which their laws aggressively bar coordination between candidates and outside groups. See LEE ET AL., supra note 61, at 18–21 (categorizing the strength of
coordination regulations in 15 states, and describing 10 as strong or moderate).
83. SHEPHERD & KANG, supra note 47.
84. Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of State Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1133 (1997).
85. See, e.g., KATE BERRY, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, HOW JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IMPACT CRIMINAL CASES 7–11 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/how-judicialelections-impact-criminal-cases; Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58
DUKE L.J. 623, 665–66 (2009), http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1386
&context=dlj.
86. SHEPHERD & KANG, supra note 47.
87. Id.
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matically increase the possibility of future TV attack ads,” it may incentivize judges to rule against criminal defendants.88
Politicized judicial races are not new. But the growing involvement
of outside groups raises the worrying prospect that judicial elections
will increasingly become referenda on controversial or hot-button
cases and that judges, whether consciously or unconsciously, may take
such pressures into account on the bench.
IV. NEW CHALLENGES FOR POLICY MEASURES
TO INSULATE ELECTED JUDGES
These new trends make it even more important for states to adopt
policies that can help insulate elected judges from political and special
interest pressure and mitigate the influence of special interest money.
Reforms may include strengthening recusal rules and adopting public
financing for judicial races. But here, too, the rise of outside spending
raises new challenges.
Judicial recusal is one crucial area where the rules have not kept up
with the realities of modern judicial elections, despite troubling evidence that campaign cash has an impact on judicial decision-making.89
While virtually all states require judges to step aside from hearing
cases in instances where “the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned,”90 few states have any provisions that specifically address
spending in judicial campaigns, and those that do focus on direct campaign contributions.91 Only six states have rules addressing when independent expenditures warrant recusal and even fewer address how
to treat the underlying donors to such groups.92 On this issue, recusal
standards are far out of line with public perceptions of what is required for fair adjudication. For example, a 2013 poll by the Brennan
Center for Justice and Justice at Stake found that more than 90 percent of voters believe judges should step aside from cases involving
major campaign supporters, regardless of whether they contributed directly to judicial campaigns or made independent expenditures.93
88. Id.
89. See supra notes 24–5.
90. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.11(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
91. ADAM SKAGGS & ANDREW SILVER, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, PROMOTING FAIR
AND IMPARTIAL COURTS THROUGH RECUSAL REFORM 1 (2011), http://www.brennancenter.org/
sites/default/files/legacy/Democracy/Promoting_Fair_Courts_8.7.2011.pdf.
92. BANNON, supra note 16, at 16. Indeed, Wisconsin has gone to the other extreme, adopting
a recusal rule in 2010 providing that a judge “shall not be required” to recuse herself based solely
on campaign spending. Wis. SCR 60.04(7).
93. New Poll: Vast Majority of Voters Fear Campaign Cash Skews Judges’ Decisions, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.brennancenter.org/press-release/new-pollvast-majority-voters-fear-campaign-cash-skews-judges-decisions.
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Secret money poses further challenges for state recusal regimes because undisclosed donors, or donors hidden behind multiple layers of
shell groups, can obscure conflicts of interest that would otherwise
warrant judicial recusal. Litigants, of course, cannot seek recusal if
they do not know that a conflict exists. Judges may likewise lack sufficient information to make an informed recusal determination or may
only be able to do so after a burdensome review. Secret money is not
an issue unique to judicial elections, to be sure, and stronger disclosure regimes are needed across the board.94 But states also lack narrower provisions targeting the unique threats secret money poses to
judicial integrity, such as a requirement that litigants and lawyers notify courts about any contributions to groups that supported or opposed the campaigns of judges hearing their suits.95
Outside spending also poses challenges to the efficacy of the codes
of conduct that restrain the behavior of judges and judicial candidates.
Most obviously, while these codes generally prohibit judicial candidates from “engag[ing] in political or campaign activity that is inconsistent with the independence, integrity, or impartiality of the
judiciary,”96 they leave outside groups free to engage in such activities. Nor do these codes provide guidance to judges and judicial candidates regarding how to interact with outside groups, including the
kind of “fundraising” activities that may be permissible as it applies to
these groups. For example, the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct
includes a provision barring candidates from “personally solciti[ing] or
accept[ing] campaign contributions other than through a campaign
committee,”97 but is silent as to how judges can interact with outside
groups that may be spending independently or with the donors of an
outside group. Can they appear at an event? Discuss campaign strategy? Among other things, these gaps raise the possibility that in some
instances judges may know the identity of donors to secretive groups,
and may even be involved in soliciting their support, while litigants
and the public are left in the dark.
Finally, the growing role of outside spending is also problematic for
some policy goals associated with another key reform—public financing of judicial elections. Currently, two states, West Virginia and New
Mexico, provide for public financing of high court races.98 Two other
94. For examples of potential policy reforms to encourage the disclosure of secret money, see
LEE ET AL., supra note 61, at 23–28.
95. For an example of what such a proposal could look like, see SKAGGS & SILVER, supra note
77, at 15–16.
96. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
97. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.1(A)(8) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
98. BANNON, supra note 16, at 16.
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states, North Carolina and Wisconsin, previously had systems that
were eliminated.99 Public financing serves numerous purposes, including insulating judges from the special interest pressures associated
with fundraising and creating new pathways to the bench for diverse
candidates.100 However, in three of the last five publicly financed supreme court elections, outside groups were major players, far outspending the candidates themselves.101 The growing prominence of
outside groups provides an alternative pathway for money to exert
influence and risks undermining at least some of public financing’s
benefits. It also places greater financial pressure on the system,
which, in order to be viable, must be sufficiently funded so that candidates can run competitive races even in the face of substantial outside
spending.102
V.

CONCLUSION

Citizens United transformed elections in the United States and judicial elections are no exception. The growing importance of outside
group spending post-Citizens United is not unique to judicial elections,103 but judicial elections pose unique policy challenges because
of the role of courts as an institution. Courts are constitutionally obligated to “hold the balance nice, clear, and true.”104 Political and special interest pressure, if not adequately checked, threatens this basic
promise of equal justice, undermining both the appearance and reality
of fairness in state court systems. However, just as judicial elections
raise unique policy concerns, they may also lend themselves to unique
policy responses.
Some responses are legally straight-forward, even if challenging to
implement. It seems obvious, for example, that states would benefit
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS: THE FACES OF
SMALL DONOR PUBLIC FINANCING 9, 11 (DeNora Getachew & Ava Mehta, eds., 2016), https://
www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Faces_of_Public_Financing.pdf.
101. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 24, at 6; Buying Time 2016 – West Virginia, BRENNAN
CENTER FOR JUSTICE, https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/buying-time-2016-west-virginia
(last visited Aug. 2, 2017); Buying Time 2016 – New Mexico, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE,
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/buying-time-2016-new-mexico (last visited Aug. 2, 2017).
102. A 2011 Supreme Court decision heightened these financial pressures, by barring socalled trigger matching provisions, which provide for additional infusions of public funds in response to outside spending. Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S.
721 (2011). Although Arizona Free Enterprise Club did not address judicial races, lower courts
have applied it to bar trigger matching provisions in judicial elections as well. See, e.g., State ex
rel. Loughry v. Tennant, 229 W. Va. 630 (2012).
103. See, e.g., WEINER, supra note 34, at 4. Outside Spending, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE
POLITICS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2017).
104. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\67-2\DPL205.txt

186

unknown

Seq: 18

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

2-MAR-18

14:56

[Vol. 67:169

from recusal rules and judicial canons that respond to the realities of
modern judicial campaigns, including provisions that address spending
by outside groups. States might also consider broader applications of
a 2015 Supreme Court decision, Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, which
upheld Florida’s prohibition on the direct solicitation of campaign
contributions by judicial candidates. Williams-Yulee recognized that
states have a compelling state interest in “judicial integrity,”105 which
justifies restrictions on campaign speech and conduct that would not
be permissible in the context of elections for political office. As Chief
Justice John Roberts explained, “Judges are not politicians, even when
they come to the bench by way of the ballot. And a State’s decision to
elect its judiciary does not compel it to treat judicial candidates like
campaigners for political office.”106 Williams-Yulee raises intriguing
questions about how far “judicial integrity” might take states in justifying campaign finance and other regulations that would be barred
under existing jurisprudence with respect to political campaigns.
Finally, states are long past due in taking a hard look at how they
structure their judicial selection systems in light of modern election
realities. For example, with judges regularly subject to attacks for
their decisions on the bench, states should take seriously the substantial evidence that reelection pressures are impacting how judges are
ruling in cases107 and consider eliminating such pressures by adopting
a lengthy single term for judges. States should also consider whether a
switch to gubernatorial appointments, with input from a nominating
commission with diverse membership, may better preserve key values
such as judicial independence. Moreover, states may want to consider
whether robust judicial conduct rules and disciplinary procedures may
be preferable to elections as an accountability mechanism for judges.
Even before Citizens United, state supreme court elections had become increasingly costly and politicized. The growing role of outside
groups post-Citizens United sharpens and exacerbates many of these
challenges. To date, states have done remarkably little to stem the
tide of special interest money. Absent reform, state courts around the
country may increasingly face questions as to whether they are capable of meeting basic principles of justice.

105. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. at 1659 (citing Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009)).
106. Id. at 1662.
107. BANNON, supra note 16, at 5.
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